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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two recent Federal Circuit decisions, Classen Immunotherapies, 
Inc. v. Biogen Idec.1 and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar,2 
have created an intra-circuit split regarding the scope of the Hatch-
                                                                                                                                     
 †  J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Bucknell 
University, 2010.  The author would like to thank Professor Jordan K. Paradise for her 
support, guidance, and insight throughout the writing process. 
 1 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 2 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
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Waxman Act’s3 “safe harbor” provision.  The safe harbor protects 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers from patent infringement claims 
by the brand-name pharmaceutical patent holder if the patented 
techniques are used for required submissions to the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), usually to obtain FDA approval.4  In the past, 
the issue with interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision has been 
exclusively related to pre-market approval activities.  Classen and 
Momenta address whether the safe harbor provision extends to activities 
after the generic drug has been approved.  The panels deciding the two 
cases used different reasoning and ultimately came to two different 
conclusions; the Classen panel used the legislative history of the statute 
to interpret the scope of the safe harbor provision to exclude post-FDA-
approval methods, while the Momenta panel used only the statutory text 
to interpret the statute to conclude that the scope of the safe harbor does 
include post-FDA-approval methods.  These conflicting decisions have 
created uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry and the issue needs to 
be resolved. 
This Comment discusses the negative impact that the uncertainty of 
the safe harbor’s scope will have on the pharmaceutical industry.  Part II 
of this Comment details the background of the Hatch-Waxman safe 
harbor provision and how it influences the seemingly conflicting 
outcomes in Classen and Momenta.  Part III then addresses the 
implications these decisions will have on the future of generic drugs and 
the uncertainty that they create in the industry, and it will also suggest 
possible temporary and long-term solutions to this uncertainty.  
Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the best way to define the scope 
of the safe harbor provision is to have Congress address the issue through 
statutory amendment to clarify its limits and specifically state whether it 
applies to post-approval activities; however, a short-term solution is to 
have the FDA set forth a guidance for the industry to clarify its opinion 
on the issue. 
                                                                                                                                     
 3 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) (2010).  The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, is informally known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.” 
 4 See id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Drug Approval Process and Patent Implications 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) regulates the 
manufacture, use, and sale of drugs.5  For a drug to enter the market, the 
FDCA requires that the FDA approve it by determining that it is safe and 
effective.6  For a pharmaceutical manufacturer to obtain this approval, it 
must submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the FDA.7  This 
process requires multiple stages and usually takes many years to 
complete.8  During the first stage—the preclinical stage—a 
pharmaceutical sponsor tests the toxicology of the drug by performing 
synthesis and purification, as well as some limited testing on animals.9  
This stage usually takes three to four years.10  After the completion of the 
drug’s preclinical testing, the manufacturer moves ahead to the clinical 
stage, which requires an Investigative New Drug Application (“IND”) 
and three clinical phases.11  Phase I tests the safety of the drug by 
conducting clinical trials on healthy individuals; Phase II tests the safety, 
dosing, and efficacy through administering the drug to volunteers in the 
target population; and Phase III tests the safety, efficacy, and side effects 
of the drug.12  This stage is incredibly lengthy and spans between 6 and 
11 years.13  Once that is completed, the manufacturer submits the NDA.14  
The NDA explains the results of the clinical trials and sets forth the 
ingredients of the new drug, how it is manufactured, and how it works.15  
The FDA evaluates the drug safety, effectiveness, and labeling to 
determine whether it will be approved.16  Once the drug has obtained 
approval, it can be marketed with FDA regulated labeling.17  The entirety 
                                                                                                                                     
 5 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 355(a) (Lexis 2013). 
 6 Id. 
 7 21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013). 
 8 See Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval 
Process, J AM BOARD FAM MED (2001), www.medscape.com/viewarticle/405869. 
 9 Synthesis of the drug is the composition process, or putting together the 
compounds to make the drug.  Purification is the process of  removing impurities in the 
chemical components of the drug.  21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013). 
 10 See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 8. 
 11 21 U.S.C.A. §355 (Lexis 2013). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Lipsky & Sharp, supra note 8. 
 14 Id. 
 15 21 C.F.R. §314 (Lexis 2013). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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of this FDA approval process can take anywhere from eleven to fourteen 
years.18 
The lengthy time period required for FDA approval creates 
implications for both brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
generic manufacturers, which is what the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to 
fix.  Before Hatch-Waxman, the time necessary to obtain FDA approval 
consumed a large portion of the patent life of the brand-name drug, while 
the extent of time and money that a manufacturer had to invest to obtain 
approval was a significant disincentive to generic manufacturers.19  
While the brand-name manufacturer holds the patent for the drug, 
generic companies are prohibited from selling the generic version on the 
market.  This gives the brand-name drug company patent exclusivity of 
the drug for the life of the patent.  Brand-name manufacturers lost some 
of these exclusivity benefits because the process required the 
manufacturers to conduct lengthy clinical trials and await regulatory 
review before being able to place the drug on the market.20  This long 
process cut significantly into the limited term of the patent and, as a 
result, the patentee drug manufacturers “were unable to profit from their 
invention’s market exclusivity . . . limiting the economic advantage the 
patentees could derive from their temporary monopoly.”21  On the other 
end, there was little incentive for manufacturers to develop generic drugs 
because they were required to wait until after the patent term for the 
brand name drug ended to initiate the lengthy FDA approval process.22  
This lengthy FDA approval process created economic disadvantages for 
both the brand-name and generic manufacturers, highlighting the 
intersection between patent law and FDA regulation. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers regularly seek patents for both their 
new and generic drug products.  A patent gives the holder the “right to 
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or 
importing the patented invention for the term of the patent.”23  This is 
designed to give pharmaceutical companies incentive to invest in 
researching and developing new products.24  Section 271(a) of the Hatch-
                                                                                                                                     
 18 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.org (last visited May 15, 
2014). 
 19 Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, HARVARD LEDA, 28 
(2003). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 35 U.S.C. 154 (Lexis 2013). 
 24 Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, HARVARD LEDA, 28 
(2003). 
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Waxman Act states that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . during the term of the patent 
therefore, infringes the patent.”25  However, § 271 also creates an 
exemption to this rule of infringement.  The Act was executed to amend 
the FDCA to address “the need for innovative new pharmaceuticals and 
the availability of less expensive generic drugs.”26  The Act facilitates 
generic entry in the pharmaceutical market by making it easier for 
manufacturers to obtain FDA approval in a shorter period of time.27  
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic market was neither 
prevalent nor profitable.28  The generic drug company was required to 
submit an NDA with results of studies conducted to show the safety and 
effectiveness of the drug, even though the brand-name drug manufacturer 
already submitted similar safety and effectiveness studies.29  The 
extensive time and costs required for generic drug manufacturers to gain 
FDA approval made it unlikely that the manufacturer would recover its 
investment.  This was a huge disincentive for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to invest in developing generic drugs.30 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., which 
prohibited competitors from performing tests required for FDA approval 
using patented methods until those patents expired.31  This ruling 
prevented generic manufacturers from beginning testing on the drug until 
the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expired, which “resulted in the 
generic not being able to obtain FDA approval until about two years 
following the expiration of the brand innovator’s patent.”32  Congress 
enacted the Hatch-Waxman to overrule Roche.33  Title I of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 sets out the procedure for the Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(“ANDAs”). This abbreviated procedure allows a generic manufacturer 
to take advantage of the brand-name manufacturer’s lengthy clinical 
research procedures.  The approval process is expedited, allowing them 
to enter the market much faster than if they had to go through the clinical 
                                                                                                                                     
 25 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (Lexis 2013). 
 26 SCHACHT, WENDY H. & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG, RESEARCH SERV., RL31379, THE 
“HATCH-WAXMAN” ACT: SELECT PATENT-RELATED ISSUES, Summary (2002). 
 27 Id at 2. 
 28 Kristen E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests of 
Survival of the Fittest?  57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 249 (2002). 
 29 Id. at 250. 
 30 Id. at 249. 
 31 733 F. 2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 32 Behrendt, supra note 26, at 250. 
 33 H.R.Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984). 
444 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:439 
 
research process that new drugs must complete, because they are now 
able to enter the market as soon as the patent expires.34 
Section 505(j) of the FDCA addresses the abbreviated process for 
FDA approval of generic bioequivalent drugs.35  This provision allows 
manufacturers to file an ANDA, which rely on the original 
manufacturer’s safety and efficacy test results.36  The provisions of the 
ADNA do not require the generic manufacturer to submit its own safety 
and effectiveness studies.37  Instead, the manufacturer must submit 
information showing that the generic has the same active ingredients, 
dosage form, route of administration, and strength as the pioneer drug 
that the FDA has already approved.38  The ANDA also requires the 
generic manufacturer to show that the generic drug is bioequivalent to 
the approved drug.39  If a generic manufacturer can show bioequivalence 
between the generic drug and the pioneer drug, the FDA can approve the 
drug without the proof of safety or efficacy required for NDAs.40  Under 
the ANDA procedure, a drug is “bioequivalent” if: 
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show 
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of 
the listed drug . . . or (ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does 
not show a significant difference from the extent of absorption of 
the listed drug . . . and the difference from the listed drug in the 
rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its 
proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective 
body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is considered 
medically insignificant for the drug.41 
The bioequivalency requirement for the ANDA, rather than safety 
and efficacy tests that the NDA requires, allows the generic to be able to 
receive FDA approval much faster.42  The Act attempts to balance the 
competing interests discussed above by extending the length of the patent 
term for brand-name manufacturers to restore some of the term that was 
lost due to clinical testing, while allowing generic manufacturers to 
                                                                                                                                     
 34 See ALLAN M. FOX & ALAN R. BENNET, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DRUG 
PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, iii-iv (1987). 
 35 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 505(j) (Lexis 2013). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.  A generic drug is bioequivalent if it contains the same active ingredient as the 
original.  21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (Lexis 2013). 
 41 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(8)(B) (Lexis 2013). 
 42 See Karbalai, supra note 19. 
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obtain FDA approval during the patent period (without being subject to 
infringement) and enter the market as soon as the patent expires.43 
In addition to its creation of ANDAs, Congress included a Safe 
Harbor in the Hatch-Waxman Act to further intentivize creation of new 
drugs as well as increase the public’s access to cheaper generic drugs.44  
The safe harbor provides that: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell within the United States or import into the United States a 
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products.45 
The language of the statute leaves room for ambiguity and 
interpretation of certain terms by the courts.  “The terms in the statutory 
language differ in certain respects from those in other provisions of the 
Act . . . [s]everal words and phrases . . . raised several important 
questions that were left to the courts to determine.”46  Specifically, the 
terms “solely,” “reasonably related,” and “development and submission 
of information” have required courts to contemplate how the statute 
should be interpreted.47 
Hatch-Waxman’s legislative history provides helpful insight into 
the intended meaning of the statutory language.  The legislature strove to 
“restore[] patent terms to pharmaceutical inventions in order to offset the 
lengthy waiting period prior to receiving FDA pre-market approval to 
sell a new drug” and “permit[] generic companies to use the patented 
products in preparing their applications for similar regulatory approval 
before the patent terms expire so that brand companies cannot enjoy a 
longer monopoly than allowed by the patent statute.”48  Excerpts from the 
congressional record indicate that the limited purpose of the safe harbor 
provision was to facilitate the generic drug application process to the 
FDA for approval.  During this process, the generic manufacturer must 
submit data to the FDA to establish bioequivalence, and further: 
In order to complete this application, the generic manufacturer 
must conduct certain drug tests.  In order to complete this type of 
                                                                                                                                     
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010). 
 46 Karbalai, supra note 19, at 28. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Chenwei Wang, In Search of the Boundary of the Safe Harbor, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 
617 (2010). 
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testing, section 202 of the bill creates general exception to the 
rules of patent infringement. Thus, a generic manufacturer may 
obtain a supply of a patented drug product during the life of the 
patent and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those 
tests is to submit an application for FDA approval.49 
The legislative history also suggests that the safe harbor is intended 
to allow for activities only in preparation for commercial activity.  In a 
House floor debate, Representative Kastenmeier stated that “[t]he 
purpose of sections 271(e)(1) and (2) is to establish that experimentation 
with a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for 
commercial activity which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not 
patent infringement.”50  Congress intended only minimal interference 
with a patent holder’s rights through application of this provision.  As 
stated in the House Report: “[T]he only activity which will be permitted 
by the bill is a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers 
can establish the bioequivalency of a generic substitute . . . thus, the 
nature of the interference with the rights of the patent holder is not 
substantial.”51  Congress had several concerns regarding the safe harbor 
provision during the enactment process, including “[t]aking property 
rights away from people and away from companies”52 and 
“compromis[ing] the rights of present patent holders by permitting their 
adverse use of that particular product by potential competitors prior to 
the time that the patent expires.”53  There were also concerns that this 
leniency on patent infringement would contradict the United States’ 
position on the importance of patent rights.54 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Variant Interpretations of the “Safe Harbor” 
Provision 
The difficulty of interpreting the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is 
apparent through both the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s varying 
decisions.  There have been several recent Supreme Court cases that have 
addressed the interpretation of the scope of § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor 
provision, including Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.55 and Merck 
                                                                                                                                     
 49 130 Cong. Rec. at H8708, (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) 
(emphasis added). 
 50 Id. (emphasis added). 
 51 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 8 (1984). 
 52 130 Cong. Rec. at H8710 (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. Michael DeWine). 
 53 130 Cong. Rec. at H8710 (Aug. 4, 1984) (statement of Rep. William Moorhead). 
 54 See generally Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 55 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
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KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.56  Both of these cases addressed pre-
marketing approval mechanisms.57  In Eli Lilly, the Court interpreted 
§ 271(e)(1) to extend to medical devices as well as drugs, based on the 
plain language of the statute.58  This was a departure from the decision 
below, where the Federal Circuit decided the case by using the legislative 
history to interpret the meaning of the statute.59  In contrast, the Supreme 
Court initially looked at the legislative history but ultimately disregarded 
it, reasoning that if the legislative intent was to single out drugs, “there 
were available infinitely more clear and simple ways of expressing that 
intent.”60    The decision broadened the scope of the safe harbor 
provision by holding that § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the 
“use of patented inventions reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information needed to obtain marketing approval of 
medical devices under the FDCA.”61 
In Merck, the Supreme Court again broadened the scope of the safe 
harbor provision.  Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit majority opinion by Judge Rader argued that the legislative 
history and intent of the provision is clear, and interpreted the meaning 
of the phrase “solely for uses reasonably related” narrowly by focusing 
on the word “solely.”62  The Supreme Court, rather than focusing its 
attention on the word “solely,” hung its analysis on a broad interpretation 
of the term “reasonably related.”63 This significantly broadened the scope 
of the safe harbor provision to include pre-clinical experiments used to 
develop new drugs, not just generics, if they are regularly submitted to 
the FDA to get approval.64  The Court also held that the safe harbor 
applies even when the experiments are not ultimately submitted to the 
FDA, as long as they are relevant to the submissions.65  This broad 
interpretation of the safe harbor provision protects “all uses of patented 
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission 
of any information under the FDCA.”66  Based on the Supreme Court’s 
apparent difficulty in interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision, 
                                                                                                                                     
 56 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 57 See generally Merck, 545 U.S. 193; Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661. 
 58 496 U.S. at 661. 
 59 Id. at 668–69. 
 60 Id. at 667. 
 61 Id. at 661. 
 62 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205 (2005). 
 63 Id. at 204–05. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 207–08. 
 66 Id. at 202 (emphasis in original). 
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there is clearly some ambiguity in the language of § 271(e)(1), as well as 
disparity between the legislative history and the plain language of the 
statute, which has led to uncertainty as to the true scope of the provision. 
C.  The Federal Circuit’s Recent Inconsistency Regarding the “Safe 
Harbor’s” Application to Post-FDA Approval Activities 
A major uncertainty that has arisen due to the safe harbor’s 
ambiguity is whether it applies to post-FDA approval activities.  Eli Lilly 
and Merck focused on only pre-approval activities.67  However, there 
have been two recent Federal Circuit cases addressing the post-approval 
issue.68  These issues arise when the FDA requires the drug 
manufacturers to produce information even after the drug has been 
approved.  A review of the cases demonstrates that the Federal Circuit 
has produced contradicting opinions and different methods of 
interpretation to resolve factually similar disputes.69 
In Classen, Classen alleged that Biogen and GlaxoSmithKline 
(collectively “Biogen”) infringed on its patent by participating in studies 
linking the timing of childhood vaccines to the development of certain 
diseases, because Classen owned the patent to Biogen’s methods.70  
Classen argued that § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor provision is limited to 
“activities conducted to obtain pre-marketing approval of generic 
counterparts of patented inventions, before patent expiration.”71  Biogen 
contended that its reporting to the FDA the results from the studies fell 
squarely within the safe harbor provision.72  Judges Rader and Newman 
wrote the majority opinion, agreeing with Classen that the safe harbor 
provision “does not apply to information that may be routinely reported 
to the FDA, long after marketing approval has been obtained.”73  In 
coming to its conclusion, the majority discussed the legislative history of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The court pointed to the House Report, that 
provided that “it is not an act of patent infringement for a generic drug 
maker to import or to test a patented drug in preparation for seeking FDA 
                                                                                                                                     
 67 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 68 See generally Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 69 See generally Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 70 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1070. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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approval if marketing of the drug would occur after expiration of the 
patent.”74  The court found that the House Report makes it clear that “the 
legislation concerns [only] premarketing approval of generic drugs,” 
specifically citing the Report’s statement that “[t]he information which 
can be developed under this provision is the type which is required to 
obtain approval of the drug.”75  Importantly, “[t]he Report states that ‘the 
generic manufacturer is not permitted to market the patented drug during 
the life of the patent; all that the generic can do is test the drug for 
purposes of submitting data to the FDA for approval.’”76 
The dissent, written by Judge Moore, disagreed with the majority’s 
reliance on the legislative history of the Act to interpret the scope of the 
safe harbor provision.  Judge Moore argued that the majority’s 
interpretation is “contrary to the plain language of the statute and 
Supreme Court precedent.”77   He suggested that by looking at the plain 
language, the statute does not limit the safe harbor to exclusively pre-
FDA-approval.78  He relied on the Court’s decision in Merck, which 
provided that: 
There is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain 
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of 
research in which it is developed or the particular submission in 
which it could be included . . . [Congress] exempted from 
infringement all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ 
to the process of developing information for submission under 
any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of 
drugs.79 
Moore suggested that the majority relied too heavily on the 
legislative history.  It is undisputed that the safe harbor covers pre-
approval activity, but the legislative history does not address whether it 
covers more than that.  “The language Congress chose to enact and that 
was signed into law by the President is plain on its face.”80  Simply put, 
                                                                                                                                     
 74 Id. at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648). 
 75 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2647, 2648). 
 76 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 30 (1984), 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648). 
 77 Id. at 1083 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1083 (emphasis in original) (citing Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005)). 
 80 Id. 
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“[t]here is no ‘pre-approval’ limitation.”81  Moore argued that the plain 
language of the statute is broader than the majority concluded through its 
reliance on the legislative history.82  He ultimately concluded that Biogen 
was not required by the FDA to perform the specific infringing studies, 
and “the general administration of drugs or vaccines is not reasonably 
related to post-approval reporting activities.”83  Since the activities in 
question were not “reasonably related” to the submission of data to the 
FDA they were not protected under the safe harbor provision.84  
Following this decision by the Federal Circuit, GlaxoSmithKline filed a 
petition for certiorari to have this decision reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, which was denied on January 14, 2013.85 
The issue in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was whether patented techniques used to test the 
bioequivalence of generic drugs to generate data required by the FDA 
after the drug has been approved is protected under the safe harbor 
provision of § 271(e)(1).86  The drug in question is a generic version of 
Lovenox (enoxaparin), which prevents blood clots.87  This drug is made 
of a unique set of molecules, creating complications when submitting an 
ANDA, given the difficulty establishing that the generic has the same 
active ingredients as the existing drug.88  The FDA provided criteria (or 
“standards for identity”) for generic manufacturers to show that generic 
enaxoparin has the same active ingredients as Lovenox, and it suggested 
multiple techniques for this testing.89  Amphastar filed an ANDA for 
generic enoxaparin in March 2003 and obtained FDA approval to market 
the drug in September 2011.90  Amphastar was the first generic 
manufacturer to file an ANDA for enoxaparin.91  Subsequently, 
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Sandoz, Inc. (collectively 
“Momenta”) obtained FDA approval in July 2010 and were the first to 
actually bring the drug to the market.92  Momenta patented the “methods 
for analyzing heterogeneous populations of sulfated 
                                                                                                                                     
 81 Id. 
 82 Classen, 659 F.3d at at 1083–84. 
 83 Id. at 1084. 
 84 Id. 
 85 GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013) (mem). 
 86 See Momenta Pharms, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms, Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1348-51 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1349–50. 
 89 Id. at 1350–51. 
 90 Id. at 1351. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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polysaccharides . . .  ‘for the presence or amount of a non-naturally 
occurring sugar . . .  that results from a method of making enoxaparin.’”93 
As the only generic on the market, Momenta’s sale of enoxaparin 
generated over a billion dollars per year, largely because of the lack of 
competition.94   Momenta alleged patent infringement because 
Amphastar used Momenta’s patented methods to analyze enoxaparin 
samples for manufacturing it for commercial sale.95  Amphastar argued 
that the allegedly infringing method of testing is protected § 271(e)(1)’s 
safe harbor.96 
The district court held that “the alleged infringing activity involves 
the use of plaintiffs’ patented quality control testing methods on each 
commercial batch of enoxaparin that will be sold after FDA approval,” 
and concluded that the safe harbor does not apply.97  The court focused 
on the legislative history of the safe harbor provision and specifically 
referenced Classen to support its decision.98  Amphastar appealed, 
arguing that the ruling construed the safe harbor provision too narrowly, 
and suggested that the plain language of the statute does not preclude 
post-FDA-approval activities.99  On appeal, Momenta relied on Classen 
to urge affirmance of the district court’s ruling, arguing that, “[i]n 
Classen, this court squarely held that ‘[t]he [safe harbor] does not apply 
to information that may be routinely reported to the FDA long after 
marketing approval has been obtained.’”100  Momenta additionally 
argued that the FDA does not require the particular patented procedure, 
so the safe harbor should not apply because there are other acceptable 
testing methods available.101 
In Momenta, Judgees Moore and Dyk comprised the majority, 
while Judge Rader wrote a lengthy dissent.  Notably, Judge Moore wrote 
the dissent in Classen and Judge Rader wrote the majority opinion.  
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Here, the majority looked at the language of the statute to determine the 
scope of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision.102  The majority looked 
at the text of the provision and did not find any ambiguity, stating that 
“Congress could not have been clearer in its choice of words: as long as 
the use of the patented invention is solely for uses ‘reasonably related’ to 
developing and submitting information pursuant to ‘a Federal law’ 
regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs, it is not ‘an act of 
infringement.’”103 
The majority posited that although the provision was enacted in the 
context of the ANDA approval process, Congress used “flexible and 
expansive” language rather than specifically referencing the ANDA 
portion of the FDCA.104  The majority asserted that if Congress had 
intended the provision to be limited exclusively to information submitted 
pursuant to the FDCA, it would have used more specific language to 
indicate that intention.105  In other parts of the statute, there are 
limitations based on the FDCA that are expressly referenced, such as 
§ 271(e)(2), whereas there are no express references to the FDCA in the 
safe harbor provision.106  The majority stated that it “will not import the 
limitation of § 271(e)(2) into § 271(e)(1)” because the latter “applies to 
any use of a patented invention as long as the use is ‘reasonably related 
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.’”107  Comparing 
the inclusion of limitations in § 271(e)(2) to the lack of language 
indicating a limitation in § 271(e)(1), the majority interpreted Congress’s 
lack of a limitation in § 271(e)(1) to be intentional.108  It stated: “When 
the intent of Congress is expressed so clearly and consistently throughout 
the statute, there is neither need nor the occasion to refer to the 
legislative history.”109  The majority insisted that the legislative history is 
irrelevant in determining the scope of the safe harbor provision because 
Congress would have included language to limit the provision to pre-
approval activities if it intended that the provision be so limited.110 
The majority found that the scope of the safe harbor extends 
beyond activities related to information submitted in an ANDA so long 
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as the activity is for “uses reasonably related” to the development and 
submission of information in an ANDA.111 The majority compared this 
interpretation to the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Eli Lilly and Merck, 
in which the Court relied on the statutory language rather than the 
legislative history to interpret § 271(e)(1).  It specifically suggested that 
the Court in Merck explicitly rejected the notion that the safe harbor was 
limited to “the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic drug.”112 
The majority ultimately determined that the information obtained 
by Amphastar using the patented technique is information “submitted” 
for purposes of the statute.113    In response to Momenta’s contention that 
the information obtained using the patented technique was not 
“submitted” to the FDA, “but rather was retained by the ANDA holder,” 
the majority concluded that the FDA requires that this type of 
information be retained by the manufacturer for each batch of the generic 
drug produced for one year, and the FDA has the authority to inspect 
those records at any time for continued approval.114  The majority stated: 
We think that the requirement to maintain records for FDA 
inspection satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information to the 
FDA  . . .  the fact that the FDA does not in most cases actually 
inspect the records does not change the fact that they are for the 
‘development and submission of information under a federal 
law.’115 
The court cited Merck to support its conclusion that there is no 
infringement when “there [was] a reasonable basis for believing that the 
experiments [would] produce the types of information that are relevant to 
an IND or NDA,” regardless of whether that information was actually 
submitted to the FDA.116 
Notably, the majority found it necessary to distinguish the case 
from the decision in Classen a year earlier.  The majority posited that the 
FDA did not mandate the specific studies at issue in Classen; instead, 
only the information about adverse side effects acquired as a result of the 
studies (which used the patented method) was required by the FDA.117  It 
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found that this case “fits well within Classen because the information 
submitted is necessary both to the continued approval of the ANDA and 
to the ability to market the generic drug,” because “the submissions are 
not ‘routine submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that 
are required to maintain FDA approval.”118  The majority asserted that: 
[U]nlike Classen[,] where the patented studies performed were 
not mandated by the FDA, the information here is not generated 
voluntarily by the manufacturer but is generated by FDA 
requirements the manufacturer is obligated under penalty of law 
to follow . . . Under a proper construction of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1), the fact that Amphastar’s testing is carried out to 
‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements’ means it falls within the scope 
of the safe harbor, even though the activity is carried out after 
approval . . . Unlike Classen, where the allegedly infringing 
activity ‘may’ have eventually led to an FDA submission, there is 
no dispute in this case that Amphastar’s allegedly infringing 
activities are carried out to ‘satisfy the FDA’s requirements.’119 
The majority rejected the district court’s pre/post-approval 
distinction because “Classen did not turn on this artificial distinction” 
either.120   Additionally, the majority concluded that the safe harbor 
provision is not limited to situations where the patented invention is the 
only way to submit the information required by the FDA.  The safe 
harbor still applies even when there are non-infringing alternatives 
available to the generic manufacturer.121 
Judge Rader, in his lengthy dissent, disagreed with the majority’s 
expansive interpretation of the safe harbor provision, arguing that “[t]his 
expansion of the law circumvents the purpose of the law and ignores the 
binding precedent of [Classen].”122  Rader lamented that “this result will 
render worthless manufacturing test method patents.”123  He asserted that 
the interpretation of § 271(e)(1) should rely on the legislative history of 
the Act, not the plain language of the statute.124  In his argument, he 
referenced Eli Lilly, where the Court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
observed that the text alone of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) can be ‘not plainly 
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comprehensible.’”125  In support of his argument for using the legislative 
history to interpret the provision, Judge Rader referred to multiple 
legislative history materials—such as House Reports, statements and 
letters, and Congressional testimony—to show that the intended scope of 
the Act was limited to only pre-approval testing necessary for FDA 
approval.126  “Nowhere in the legislative history,” Judge Rader 
concludes, “can this court find any mention of the post-approval, 
continuous, commercial sales allowed by this decision.”127   He 
suggested that “[s]pecifically, § 271(e)(1) won approval because it was 
limited in time, quantity, and type,” and that “time” applies exclusively 
to pre-marketing approval.128  He emphasized that the authors of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act undoubtedly intended for the provision to be limited 
in these ways.  “In particular, the authors made clear that section 
271(e)(1) would not apply to commercial sales, i.e., the ‘infringing’ 
product would not enter the market until after the patent’s life.”129 
Judge Rader, who was himself was present during the drafting of 
this Act, insisted that “[t]he authors of this section (and I hesitate to add 
that I was present through this legislative process) did not imagine that 
§ 271(e)(1) would allow continuous, commercial infringing sales during 
any portion of the life of the patent.”130  His dissent suggested that the 
majority’s opinion was completely contrary to Congress’s intent during 
the legislative process, and the way the majority “rewr[ote]” the law will 
allow Amphastar to infringe throughout the entire life of Momenta’s 
patent for commercial purposes, competing with Momenta.131  Judge 
Rader further argued that the majority did not consider the word “solely” 
in its interpretation of the statute.132  He suggested that Amphastar uses 
the patented method for commercial purposes, not “solely” for 
developing and submitting information to the FDA.133 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
“submission.”134  Judge Rader argued that “[m]aintaining or keeping a 
document has the exact opposite meaning of submitting a document.  In 
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other words, ‘submission’ means not really submitting anything – a 
strange construction of an ‘unambiguous’ term.”135  He contended that 
the statutory language and legislative history make it clear that its 
intended scope is for pre-FDA-approval activity only.136  “Therefore, a 
reading of all the words in the statute and a reading of those words in 
light of their legislative history shows that § 271(e)(1) only permits a 
limited amount of pre-approval experiments to obtain FDA approval.”137  
In his analysis, Judge Rader relied on the Classen decision’s use of the 
legislative history, as well as Supreme Court precedent.138  Rader fully 
rejected the majority’s effort to distinguish Classen, highlighting that 
Judge Moore’s dissent in Classen referenced the distinction between pre- 
and post-approval activities, while in this opinion he insisted that 
Classen does not distinguish in this way.139  Additionally, the parties and 
amici interpreted Classen to distinguish pre- and post-approval 
activities.140  The dissent also expressed disapproval of the majority’s 
characterization of activities mandated or not mandated by the FDA.141  
Lastly, Judge Rader asserted that the majority opinion, unlike the 
decision in Classen, went against the Supreme Court’s holdings in Eli 
Lilly and Merck.142  Those cases dealt only with pre-approval activity and 
submissions, and the majority “takes phrases from those opinions out of 
context to allege that its new interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) is 
consistent with those cases.”143 
After the Federal Circuit decided Momenta in August, Momenta 
filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc.  Momenta argued that the panel 
decision in Momenta is contrary to Classen.144  Momenta suggested that 
“[t]he panel’s interpretation expands Section 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor into 
a safe ocean,” even though “nothing in the text or purpose of Section 
271(e)(1) warrants the panel’s expansive reading.”145  The petition 
highlighted the inconsistencies between the Classen and Momenta 
decisions and relied on Judge Rader’s arguments in dissent in 
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Momenta.146  In addition, Momenta’s petition detailed the implications of 
this uncertainty as to the scope of the safe harbor provision, making it 
necessary for the court to resolve the inconsistency.147  In September, 
shortly after Momenta filed this petition, Classen Immunotherapies 
submitted a brief of amicus curiae in support of Momenta’s petition for 
rehearing en banc.148  In its brief, Classen urged the Federal Circuit to 
reevaluate the outcome in Momenta by suggesting that the outcome was 
in “direct and irreconcilable conflict with the decision” in Classen and by 
discussing the impact it will have on whether the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari in the Classen case.149  Classen insisted “the two decisions 
cannot logically coexist, because Section 271(e)(1) cannot 
simultaneously be restricted to protecting only pre-marketing uses of 
patented invention as it was written, and also be expanded to protect 
some post-marketing activities.”150  Classen argued that the effect of the 
Momenta decision is contrary to the purpose of patent laws.151  Despite 
Momenta’s petition and Classen’s amicus brief urging the Federal 
Circuit to reevaluate the panel’s decision in Momenta, its petition for 
rehearing en banc was denied on November 20, 2012.152 
As noted, GlaxoSmithKline filed a petition for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Classen.153  In 
December of 2012, the United States submitted an amicus brief 
discouraging the Supreme Court from granting the petition for 
certiorari.154  Although the United States expressed its view that the 
Federal Circuit erred in the Classen decision, it concluded that “there is 
no longer any practical need for this Court’s intervention in light of the 
Federal Circuit’s subsequent decision in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.”155  The brief detailed the reasons 
the Federal Circuit’s Momenta decision came out correctly, suggesting 
that: 
                                                                                                                                     
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 9–10. 
 148 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. In Support of 
the Petition for Rehearing En Banc, 686 F. 3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2012-1062, -
1103, -1104). 
 149 Id. at iv. 
 150 Id. at 1–2. 
 151 Id. at 3. 
 152 2012-1062 Docket entry No. 86 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2012). 
 153 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1078). 
 154 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1078). 
 155 Id. at 10. 
458 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:439 
 
Congress not only contemplated that drug manufacturers would 
conduct post-approval scientific studies and clinical trials, but 
specifically authorized the FDA to require such studies in a 
variety of circumstances.  If such post-approval studies involve 
the use of patented inventions solely for uses reasonably related 
to the development and submission of information to the FDA, 
the plain language of Section 271(e)(1) precludes any claim for 
patent infringement.156 
The United States’ reasoning relied primarily on the plain-language 
interpretation of the safe harbor provision, noting that “nothing in the 
language of the statute links the availability of Section 271(e)(1)’s safe 
harbor to the timing of FDA marketing approval.”157  The brief addressed 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Merck and Eli Lilly and determined 
that they do not allow the court of appeals to conclude that the safe 
harbor only protects pre-approval activity.158   Despite the United States’ 
in-depth reasoning about why the Federal Circuit came to the wrong 
conclusion in Classen, the United States ultimately determined that there 
was no need for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari given the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Momenta, and accepted Momenta’s narrow 
interpretation of Classen.  On January 14, 2013, the Supreme Court of 
the United States denied the petition for certiorari.159  The Supreme Court 
had another opportunity to address the issue when Momenta filed a 
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.  Despite the need for 
Supreme Court review, Momenta’s petition was denied on June 24, 
2013.160  The Supreme Court did not give a reason for refusing to grant 
certiorari.161 
III. ANALYSIS 
The inconsistent decisions in Classen and Momenta have created an 
intra-circuit split within the Federal Circuit.  The two cases are far too 
similar to produce such disparate outcomes.  Although the majority in 
Momenta briefly attempted to distinguish the Classen decision, this was 
a half-hearted attempt detailed in only a few sentences.  The majority 
suggested that its decision in Momenta fits within a narrowly construed 
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Classen opinion, arguing that “the submissions are not ‘routine 
submissions’ to the FDA, but instead are submissions that are required to 
maintain FDA approval.”162  It also highlighted that, “unlike Classen[,] 
where the patented studies performed were not mandated by the FDA, 
the information here is not generated voluntarily by the manufacturer but 
is generated by FDA requirements the manufacturer is obligated under 
penalty of law to follow.”163  Here, the information was gathered for the 
purpose of submitting information to the FDA as opposed to the 
primarily non-FDA purposes in Classen,164 
In dissent, Judge Rader disagreed with this reasoning, stating that 
this decision “ignores the binding precedent of Classen.”165  Judge Rader, 
who wrote the majority opinion in Classen, made it clear in his dissent 
that he does not think the Momenta decision can be reconciled with the 
outcome in Classen.166  There are explicit inconsistencies with the 
court’s decisions.  In addition, Judge Rader himself was present during 
the drafting of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  He witnessed firsthand the 
discussions addressing the purposes of the Act and was aware of 
Congress’s intentions regarding it.  Judge Rader argued that the court 
should primarily use the legislative history to interpret the scope of the 
safe harbor provision, which he did in Classen, and that the majority in 
Momenta was wrong for not considering it in their interpretation.167  The 
legislative history clearly suggests that the scope of the safe harbor 
provision was intended to be very limited in time and scope.  The 
purpose of the provision is to facilitate the lengthy FDA approval process 
for generic manufacturers.168  The safe harbor provision is included in the 
statute so that generic drugs can obtain FDA approval faster and more 
easily, which suggests that the scope should be limited to activities 
before the drug obtains approval from the FDA.169 
The core of the issue lies in the proper method of interpreting the 
statute.  Courts generally look first at the plain language of a statute to 
interpret its meaning.170  If there are no ambiguities in the wording of the 
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text, the courts construe the meaning of the statute simply by looking at 
the language used.171  However, if the court finds that there are 
ambiguities in the plain language of the statute, it will usually look to 
sources outside the text of the statute itself, such as the legislative 
history, to determine what Congress intended the statute to  mean.172  In 
Classen, the majority found that there was ambiguity in the text of 
§ 271(e)(1).173  The words “solely,” “reasonably related,” “development 
and submission” and “federal law which regulates . . . drugs” are terms 
that the Classen court argued were ambiguous and could not properly be 
interpreted by looking exclusively at the words of the statute.174  For this 
reason, the court found it necessary to look into the legislative history of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to better determine what Congress 
intended those words to mean in the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.175  As discussed, when the legislative history is taken into 
consideration, it seems readily apparent that Congress intended 
§ 271(e)(1) to be limited to information submitted to the FDA in order to 
obtain FDA approval, and was not intended to cover infringing activities 
after the drug gained approval.176  In this respect, Classen interpreted the 
statute correctly. 
In contrast, the Momenta majority found that the plain language of 
§ 271(e)(1) is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, that the legislative 
history should not be taken into account.177  This majority argued that the 
legislature carefully picked the words used in the statute and 
intentionally left out a pre- and post-approval distinction.178  If the 
majority is correct that the statutory text is unambiguous, its method of 
interpretation is also correct.  Looking solely at the plain language of the 
statute, in conjunction with later provisions in the Act, it is reasonable 
that the statute can be interpreted as including any information kept by 
the drug manufacturer for submission to the FDA, even if that 
submission would occur after the drug was approved, and even if the 
FDA does not actually mandate that the information be submitted.  The 
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words in the statute say nothing about the time frame of the submissions 
and do not limit the scope of the submissions to be requirements under 
the FDCA.179  Therefore, without looking into the congressional intent of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the safe harbor does not appear to be limited to 
pre-FDA-approval activities. 
The issue then becomes which Federal Circuit panel properly 
construed the safe harbor in this circumstance.  This depends on whether 
the language in the statute is ambiguous.  Two panels of the Federal 
Circuit came to two diametrically opposite conclusions as to whether the 
safe harbor provision applies to post-approval activities.180  The panels 
looked at the exact same language in § 271(e)(1), yet one determined that 
it does not include post-approval activities, while the other argued that it 
clearly does.  Additionally, the Supreme Court has had to interpret the 
language in § 271(e)(1) multiple times.181  That a statute can espouse so 
many variant interpretations, regardless of the methods courts have used, 
suggests its ambiguous nature.  The legislative history is therefore a 
necessary tool for courts in interpreting what Congress intended the 
statute to mean. 
Without considering the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the Momenta majority interpreted the scope of the safe harbor 
provision too broadly.182  The majority used only the plain text of the 
provision to analyze its meaning, without taking any of the legislative 
intent or history into account.183  Momenta’s broad interpretation of the 
safe harbor’s scope has serious implications for the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Allowing the safe harbor to extend to infringing activities after 
the FDA has approved a drug may even extend farther than simply post-
approval analytic testing to commercial uses.  It would decrease the 
incentive for brand-name pharmaceuticals to invest time and money into 
research and development of new drugs.184  The purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act was to strike a balance by increasing the market for 
generics at cheaper prices while still leaving brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies with incentives to invest in research and development of new 
drugs.  There is a fine line to maintaining this balance and a broad 
interpretation of the scope of the safe harbor would likely skew in favor 
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of generic manufacturers.185  This would disrupt the balance, especially if 
generic companies could infringe on patents for producing their drug for 
commercial purposes.186 
However, although a broad interpretation of the scope of the safe 
harbor would disrupt the balance sought by the creators of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, an extremely narrow scope would also disrupt that balance 
by making it an overly difficult and slow process to get generics on the 
market, which would likely increase their costs.187  When interpreting the 
scope of the safe harbor provision, the courts need to be mindful of the 
underlying purposes of the Act. 
The conflicting outcomes in Classen and Momenta create 
uncertainty within the pharmaceutical industry and demonstrate the need 
for courts to provide a uniform interpretation of the scope of the safe 
harbor provision.  The uncertainty as to which activities are covered 
under the safe harbor is difficult for both the pioneer and generic 
manufacturers.  Generic manufacturers will not know if they are able to 
use patented techniques to submit information to the FDA after their 
ANDA has been approved.188  Pioneer drug manufacturers will be 
hesitant to invest in developing techniques that may be used freely by 
generic manufacturers for commercial use, which will compete with their 
own drugs throughout the life of the patent.189  This uncertainty will 
cause brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers to be wary of investing 
large amounts of time and money on developing techniques that generic 
manufacturers will use for commercial purposes after the drug is 
approved by the FDA. 
A resolution to this uncertainty is essential for the balance between 
patent protection and ability for generics to enter the market.  Ultimately, 
there are multiple routes available to resolve the ambiguous scope of the 
safe harbor.  The ideal solution would have been to have the Supreme 
Court weigh in and explicitly draw a distinction between pre- and post-
FDA-approval activities and make it clear whether or not they are 
covered under the safe harbor provision.  However, the Supreme Court 
has refused to address the issue by denying both Classen’s and 
Momenta’s petitions for certiorari.  Without a Supreme Court decision to 
resolve the issue, Congress may need to address the ambiguity in the 
wording of the statute.  Another option is action by the FDA itself.  The 
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FDA could create guidelines allowing or disallowing the safe harbor to 
apply to post-approval activities. 
A Supreme Court decision clarifying the scope of the safe harbor 
provision would have be the fastest and most efficient way to provide 
more certainty for the pharmaceutical industry by allowing 
manufacturers to predict the outcome of future infringement cases. That 
decision would have provided precedent for courts to follow in future 
infringement cases and would create uniformity in those decisions.  This 
would have been the most immediate solution to the intra-circuit split 
and would have postponed or eliminated the need for Congress to amend 
the wording of the statute or for the FDA to create guidelines. However, 
the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari for both cases,190 thereby 
prolonging the uncertainty and creating the need for an alternate remedy.  
As the issue stands currently, there is no precedent on which 
pharmaceutical manufacturers can rely, and the outcomes of future cases 
will vary. 
Since the Supreme Court denied Momenta’s petition for certiorari, 
Congress might need to address the issue by altering the text of the safe 
harbor provision.  Clearly there have been issues interpreting the 
meaning of certain terms and phrases in § 271(e)(1) regarding both pre- 
and post-approval activities.191  The courts have not always taken the 
legislative history and intent into account in their decisions, so Congress 
may need to provide what the scope of the provision should be and alter 
the language to make its intent more clear.  Specifically, Congress could 
choose to re-write the statute to explicitly state whether or not it applies 
to post-FDA-approval activities.  Since the uncertainty seems to lie in the 
wording “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information,”192 that is naturally the most sensible starting 
point for clarification.  Congress could clarify by adding text explicitly 
saying that the safe harbor applies only to pre-approval activities or that 
it applies to any activities used to submit information to the FDA.  
Alternatively, Congress could add an extra sentence following the 
provision to make it apparent whether or not the safe harbor applies to 
post-approval activities in addition to pre-approval activities.  Either 
approach would provide clarity for the pharmaceutical industry; 
                                                                                                                                     
 190 See GlaxoSmithKline v. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 973 (2013) 
(mem).; Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 
2854 (2013) (mem). 
 191 See supra note 68  and accompanying text. 
 192 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2010). 
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however, it would be a lengthy process and would not provide an 
immediate solution to the problem.193 
Lastly, the FDA could write guidelines to clarify whether the scope 
of the safe harbor encompasses post-FDA-approval activities.  The FDA 
routinely creates guidance documents for different areas of the food and 
drug laws that it is tasked with regulating.194  While these guidelines do 
not have a binding effect, reviewing courts will give them deference 
because it is such a technical area.195  The FDA already has a category of 
guidance documents for generics,196 so it could reasonably assess 
whether the pharmaceutical industry should be guided in a particular 
direction regarding the scope of the safe harbor provision and add a 
guidance document discussing the suggested interpretation.  This would 
provide helpful guidance for pharmaceutical companies uncertain of 
whether the safe harbor applies to post-FDA-approval activities.  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers will most likely follow these guidelines, 
knowing that courts will give deference to them.197  This would be the 
most probable short-term solution since the Supreme Court is currently 
unwilling to resolve this issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The conflicting Classen and Momenta decisions have emphasized 
the struggle the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, are facing 
interpreting the scope of the safe harbor provision.  These two cases have 
made it clear that the scope of the safe harbor depends largely on 
whether the court relies on the plain language of the statute—resulting in 
a broad interpretation—or the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act—leading to a much narrower interpretation.  Classen and Momenta 
each address whether the safe harbor extends to post-FDA-approval 
activities; however, the Federal Circuit used the legislative history 
approach in Classen and the plain language approach in Momenta, 
                                                                                                                                     
 193 The FDA is a Federal administrative agency, so it must go through a lengthy 
process (sometimes called “notice and comment rulemaking”) in order to promulgate 
new rules as well as amend existing rules.  This process requires that the agency notify 
the public of the proposed regulation, as well as give the public an opportunity to submit 
comments regarding the proposed regulation before issuing the final regulation or 
amendment.  See  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 194 See, e.g. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.org/Drugs/Guida
ncecomplianceRegulatoryInformation.Guidances/default.htm (last visited May 15, 2014). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See generally KM Lewis, Informal guidance and the FDA, 66(4) FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 507 (2011). 
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leading to essentially opposite outcomes.  These two decisions have 
created uncertainty as to the scope of the safe harbor and whether it 
applies to post-FDA-approval activities, highlighting the need for a 
uniform bright-line interpretation.  The persistent lack of clarity is likely 
to create major problems in the pharmaceutical industry, leading brand-
name manufacturers to be wary of spending large sums of money on 
research and development of new drugs, while generic manufacturers 
will be unsure of what constitutes infringement.  Since the Court has 
refused to clarify the scope of the safe harbor provision, either Congress 
or, at a minimum, the FDA will have to step in and provide meaningful 
guidance.  Ultimately, the scope of the safe harbor provision will need to 
be clarified in order to avoid the negative consequences that this 
uncertainty will create in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
